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1.  Why a new allocation of social responsibility is needed  
Any discussion of the idea of ‘shared social responsibility’ on a European level should be 
introduced by an explanation as to why a new allocation of social responsibilities between 
public and private actors throughout Europe is needed: how it challenges received wisdom 
and how difficult it is – also considering the possible pitfalls into which the search for a new 
model could fall.  
Putting things in very schematic terms, the old model – from which shared responsibility is a 
clear  departure  –  was  the  liberal  paradigm  (widely  accepted  within  economic  theory  for 
example) based on a simple allocation of social responsibility between the two main social 
institutions, the market and the state, where: 
•  the market, and agents operating within the market (firms, consumers etc.), are assigned 
responsibility for the efficient allocation of resources; 
•  the state is allocated responsibility for providing public goods and for reshaping the initial 
endowments with which individual agents enter the market process in order that a final 
efficient allocation of resources may be arrived at which also reflects the initial political 
choice on basic endowments.  
The typical feature of the liberal paradigm is that individuals or organized agents operating 
within the confines of the market are required to fulfil a very limited set of moral and social 
obligations. The optimal allocation of resources does not require them  to account for the 
outcomes  of  their  collective  actions  or  their  compliance  with  any  overarching  ethical 
principle, other than the need to respect commercial law and specific contracts. Under the 
typical conditions of idealized perfect competition, the rational and farsighted pursuit of self-
interest is the sole behavioural requirement in order for the market to function properly. There 
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are two versions of this minimalist view of social responsibility assigned to private market 
actors.  
(i) The first maintains that broad moral responsibility is superfluous or even impossible for 
agents operating within the marketplace because they cannot intentionally affect the market 
outcome.  Nevertheless  this  moral  neutrality  of  market  operations  does  not  prejudice  its 
outcome, which is a social optimum that fully respects negative freedoms.  
(ii) The second envisages a standard of greed  and self-interested behaviour exactly as the 
unique role-specific moral responsibility that individuals, professionals or organized private 
(corporate) actors are required to respect in order to guarantee the proper functioning of the 
market (according to a typical assumption of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics). Not 
being personally  greedy (for individual entrepreneurs or  consumers) or  not seconding the 
personal greed of owners and shareholders (for managers), would amount to a violation of the 
‘ethics of the market’, thereby jeopardizing its socially beneficial functioning. 
The old paradigm has passed through different phases. After the Second World War, up until 
the extension of civil and social rights during the 1960s and the 1970s, the paradigm also 
ideologically survived a significant expansion of the Welfare State, since the requirement of 
social responsibility was still mainly limited to the government and public servants (even 
though the remit and number of the latter increased). It must be acknowledged that in the late 
1960s the idea of corporate social responsibility arose again and inspired the “business and 
society” movement - as it had also previously been an important participant in the academic 
debate  of  the  1930s    on  corporate  governance  and  the  fiduciary  duties  of  the  modern 
corporation  (see  Bearle  and  Means  1932,  Freeman  and M c V e a ,  2 0 0 2 ,  K a u f m a n  2 0 0 2 ,  
Kaufman, A., L. Zacharias, M. Karson, 1995). Nevertheless as a matter of fact the main focus 
(at least in Europe) was on expanding the social responsibility of the public sector rather than 
on  sharing  social  responsibility  between  different  areas  of  society,  including  the  private 
agents operating through the market and the third (non profit)  sector.  
Over the last thirty years of the neo-liberal or libertarian age, the old paradigm reached its 
apogee, since it was perfectly consistent with the rolling back of the welfare state and a re-
allocation of many decision making rights and of broad discretion to private actors interacting 
through the market, in the belief that the social costs of public decision making processes 
were higher than the transaction costs associated with the exercise of decision making rights 

by  private  actors  constrained  by  the  logic  of  market  competition  (often  assumed  to  be 
“efficient markets”).   
It should be noted that, according to the prevailing view, this was again intended to comply 
with the  the principle of separability of responsibility: responsibility for efficiency (except 
for public goods in the strict sense) conferred on market actors as against responsibility for 
social  justice  and  fairness  assigned  to  the  “inefficient”  political  process.  Hence,  the  neo-
liberal age stressed even more so the belief that the minimal social responsibilities should be 
borne by private agents (see Friedman 1970 for the classical formulation of this thesis).  
This is rather paradoxical because, in general, the removal of decision making rights from one 
agent and their conferral on another also entails the transfer of the relative responsibility from 
the former to the latter. Not so for libertarians however. Due to the doctrine of the ‘invisible 
hand’  (efficient  markets  as  impersonal  mechanisms  spontaneously  reaching  efficient 
equilibria) the idea spread that not responsibility but intelligent and farsighted greed was the 
key  to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  market  and  the a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b l e  
outcomes. Thus the only requirement in terms of social responsibility was the undemanding 
obligation that self-interest should be pursued, albeit in an intelligent and far-sighted manner.  
However,  perhaps  as  an  unintended  consequence  of  the  neo-liberal  age,  the  increasing 
allocation of decision making rights, power and discretion to private organizations operating 
according to the rules of the market raised calls that also the allocation of social responsibility 
should be reshaped in accordance with the new configuration of decision making rights and 
powers. The same process that has transferred so many decision making powers from the 
public sector to the private sector on mere efficiency grounds reasonably raises the question 
concerning the social justice and social welfare consequences of private sector decisions. The 
requirement follows that – where relevant – fairness and social welfare standards should be 
met not just by public institutions but also by the decisions of powerful private agents, even 
though they operate through the market. 
In  fact  there  are  social  cohesion  pitfalls  brought  about  by  the  effect  of  private  actors’ 
decisions that the state does not cause and which it cannot face up to on its own. In such 
decisions, private actors exercise power and discretion mediated by market incentives. Some 
examples may concern: 

•  Immigration of workers from poor countries on “low cost” employment conditions. While 
providing benefits to domestic companies, private sector industries (both manufacturing 
and services) and families, immigrant workers’ demand for public welfare services is  seen 
as a crowding of these serivice and a way to ‘free ride’ on the costs of their provision – 
especially when they operate on the irregular labour market or their wages are so low that 
their  capacity  to  pay  tax  is  limited.  This  gives  rise  adverse  social  effects  such  as  the 
repugnant racial hostility  that jeopardises social cohesion in European  societies. Social 
integration  and  support  for  the  growing  costs  of  welfare  systems  associated  with  the 
immigration of low-income earners would be much better dealt with ex ante by preventive 
responsible  behaviour  on  the  part  of  private  actors –  w h i c h  m a y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  
immigrants’ social integration – rather than ex post by the state. 
•  Global effects of financial turmoil related to perverse managerial incentives resulting from 
the principle of shareholder value maximization. These generate the financial externalities 
on  economic  systems  that  have  been  widely  apparent in the most recent financial and 
economic crisis (reduced access to credit for companies, reduced demand by consumers 
etc.).  States have responded to these effects with strong stimulus policies, but they may 
not be able to repeat this success in the near future because of the level of public debt 
incurred. These effects must then be prevented by responsible behaviour from the private-
sector. 
•  Distributive inequalities generated through allocation mechanisms. Companies are ‘team 
production’  organizations  within  which  many  stakeholders  cooperate  by  making 
investments  and  contributing  to  wealth  production.  However,  authority  is  vested  in 
shareholders  and  boards  of  directors  that  are  accountable  to  shareholders  and  are 
incentivized  by  returns  conditional  on  the  share  value.  Existing  corporate  governance 
systems  do  not  give  significant  protection  to  corporate  stakeholders.  Nevertheless 
stakeholders  also  make  firm-specific  investments  while  being  imperfectly  protected  by 
incomplete contracts. At the same time, they receive no guarantees from the exercise of 
residual  rights  of  control,  as  owners,  shareholders o r  d i r e c t o r s  d o  ( s e e  S a c c o n i  2 0 0 0 ,  
2006a,b).  
These considerations should preliminarily show what shared responsibilities do not entail. It 
should be made clear that in proposing that responsibilities be shared, we are not embracing 
the view of shifting social risks, and hence responsibility for such risks, to individuals, who 

are  the  weakest  players  and  hence  the  least  able  to b e a r  s u c h  r i s k s .  T o  c i t e  o n l y  a  f e w  
examples:  
•  Company employees are required to bear the entrepreneurial risk in terms of flexibility of 
their  employment  conditions  and  liability  to  dismissal;  at  the  same  time,  there  is  no 
corresponding proposal that employees may receive protection similar to that deriving 
from the fiduciary duties owed by managers to owners.  
•  Citizens are required to bear the risk of adverse social events and to insure themselves 
against such events by means of private insurance mechanisms, even though they are not 
best able to bear such risks; however, private insurance schemes are less efficient than 
public  insurance  (universalist  welfare-state)  schemes,  and  the  recent  financial  crisis 
suggests  that  financial  markets  are  unable  to  re-insure  the  systematic  social  risks 
associated with poor people’s requirements for housing, health services etc. 
At the same time, the recognition that individual agents have only bounded rationality and are 
subject  to  systematic  cognitive  biases  has  made  the c a s e  f o r  s o m e  d e g r e e  o f  ‘ l i b e r a l  
paternalism’ (see Sunstein 2002, Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  This is intended to give people 
cognitive cues in order that they may take care of themselves, and also to prevent imprudent 
risk taking.  However, it also suggests that they are insufficiently rational and well-informed 
to bear significant social risks. In general, this change of viewpoint on the cognitive capability 
of individual agents stresses the role of ‘social responsibility duties’ that should be borne by 
those institutional actors in the private or public sectors that act as trustees for the people and 
must comply with the fiduciary duties placed on them.  
Moreover  the  ‘shifting’  of  social  responsibilities (as  opposed  to  their  ‘sharing’)  from  the 
government to private individuals, families or the market for social service provision bring 
with it the risk of not only reducing the extent of coverage of positive social rights but also of 
changing  the  nature  of  those  rights,  causing  detriment  both  to  the  universality  of  social 
citizenship as well as the impartiality and equality of treatment of people by service providers.  
2.  A minimal definition of responsibility and the challenge of its extension to shared 
responsibility  
Before  embarking  on  any  deeper  discussion  of  ‘shared  responsibility’  it  is  necessary  to 
provide a clear definition by elaborating on some minimal but unproblematic definition of 
responsibility. Hence, what at minimum does ‘responsibility’ mean? According to a standard 
view in philosophy of law (see Hart 1968), being responsible means having the capacity to be 

subjected to blame or praise due to an action or the outcome of an action in terms of some 
norm (legal or moral) from which a duty is derived. 
Duties can be associated with any right according to the logical construct of ‘claim-right’ (in 
fact, contrary to the notion of a right as liberty/permission, a right may consist in a claim to 
some benefit, action, inaction or state which entails a correlative duty incumbent upon another 
agent to provide that benefit, action, inaction or state – see Hohfeld 1923). This is therefore a 
quite basic  and overarching definition. Responsibilities can be established for compliance 
with duties deriving from negative but also positive claims – i.e. social rights where the claim 
concerns not just refraining from action (as in negative rights such as ownership) but the 
provision of a service (this point will be returned to in the next section).  
2.1. The allocation and disclaimer of responsibility 
The above definition of responsibility is useful because it leads us directly to the question as 
to what it means to be in the condition of ‘having the capability for being subjected to blame 
or praise’. Philosophers (and common sense) answer this question with the postulate “ought 
implies can” (see Hare 1963, Danley 1988). Hence one cannot be attributed responsibility for 
an act if one cannot make a choice regarding that action. Admittedly, this is rather obvious, 
but nonetheless it immediately raises a basic challenge to the definition of “shared social 
responsibilities”: we cannot share any responsibility with another (natural or legal) person if 
that person cannot make any choice concerning the matter (I have already used this idea when 
criticizing  the  alternative  program  of  shifting s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  p r i v a t e  c i t i z e n s  o r  
families who are the least able to bear these risks).  
To be somewhat more precise about the conditions for the attribution of responsibility, two 
more qualifications must be made: 
i)  in order for an agent to be held responsible for a state of affairs S, it must exert causal 
force over S by means of an action that (at least in part) causally produces S; 
ii)  moreover that action must be at least to some extent intentional, so that the agent 
concurs in the production of state of affairs S by means of an intentional action.  
Intentionality can be characterized in various ways. According to economic methodology, an 
action is intentional for a given decision making problem if it can be construed as utility 
maximizing  in  that  context.  Thus  the  agent  acts  intentionally  if  he  has  a  complete  and 

coherent  system  of  preferences  over  a  set  of  courses  of  action  (and  their  consequences), 
whereby the behaviour  observed may be derived as a best choice given the agent’s ordering 
of preferences (i.e. it is ranked as the most preferred action vis-à-vis the decision making 
problem concerned).  
Alternatively, an agent can be said to act intentionally in a given context if his or her observed 
behaviour can be interpreted in such a way as to satisfy a mental representation (which the 
agent happens to hold) of a goal and of an act that is an effective means of achieving that 
goal. If the behaviour described cannot be said to satisfy, through a consistent mind/world 
correspondence, a mental model that the agent holds regarding its goal and the action which is 
conductive to that goal, then it cannot be said to be intentional (see Searle 2001).  
However,  a  proper  understanding  of  the  conditions  for  the  attribution  of  responsibility 
requires that they should not be too demanding, in order not to extend or restrict unreasonably 
the range of subjects to whom responsibility may be attributed. For example, linear causality, 
or uniquely determining casual force, should not be required. Otherwise, practically no social 
event could be attributed to the responsibility of any agent, because it is obvious that the 
causal determination of social events always involves multiple variables. For example, it is 
usually said in organizations that “multiple hands” are the cause of a given state of affairs (see 
Thompson  1985),  or  in  games  that  the  outcome  is  brought  about  by  the  interdependent 
decisions of the participants.  
Moreover direct intention, such as having the mental representation of an outcome S as the 
proper goal of the individual’s action, also seems to be excessive. In order to be responsible 
for  S,  the  agent  need  not  have  represented  S  as  his t r u e  g o a l ;   h e / s h e  c a n  s i m p l y  h a v e  
represented  that  state  as  a  by-product  of  the  action  that  he/she  intentionally  performs  in 
pursuit of another goal, so that he/she is aware of S simply as a possible undesirable side 
effect of his/her action. The same also holds for the ‘preference explanation’ of intentionality. 
In order to attribute responsibility to an intentional actor understood in a preferential sense, 
the outcome need not be represented as if it were the end state that he/she most prefers.  It can 
be considered merely as a cost that he/she is ready to pay in order to achieve the desired 
outcome.  
As a matter of fact, the agent will not have a complete representation in his/her mind of all the 
characteristics of any particular state of affairs, so that in preferring an action that includes the 
state S as a possible consequence he/she would also reveal a preference ordering of all these 

states. He/she will explicitly apply the preference ordering only to some salient features of 
outcomes – those characteristics that are grasped as explicit decision making variables of 
interest to the decision maker within the frame of the decision making problem that comes to 
the agent’s mind (‘framing’ will be discussed again below in this section). Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of attributing responsibility it is sufficient that the agent be aware of it as a 
related state of affairs even though it is not the specific object of his or her desires. What 
counts for awareness is the effective cognitive mental representation of S as a state of affairs 
associated with the course of action.  
This  will  reduce  the  number  of  states  of  affairs  that  may  fall  within  an  agent’s  area  of 
responsibility. Since an agent is boundedly rational, he/she is effectively unable to foresee 
every possible state of the world. On the other hand, requiring a complete preference ordering 
including all the possible states of the world would exempt practically all real-world agents 
from responsibility, given that none of them would in practice be able to satisfy such a high 
standard of decision making consistency (we impose a preference ordering on states only in 
terms of the relevant features, which makes it possible to factor out many non-salient details). 
To sum up, an unintended consequence – i.e. one not envisaged ex ante as the agent’s goal or 
preferred outcome – deriving as a composition effect (that nobody specifically wanted) from 
the interaction between many intentional players can be attributed to the responsibility of 
those agents, provided that each of them acted according to some intentional goal and was 
aware of that outcome as a possible unintentional by-product of the composition process.  
Conditions  for  the  attribution  of  responsibility  are  typically  invoked  by  private  and  or 
corporate agents as grounds for disclaiming responsibility, as well as by individual citizens. 
For example, companies disclaim all responsibility for inhumane working conditions or child 
labour in the ‘low cost’ plants where they have delocalized the production of components 
necessary for their own manufacturing process, or for the employment of immigrant workers 
on discriminatory conditions (or without any contractual protection at all).
2 In doing so, they 
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•  No  information  was  available  about  what  was  going  on  in  the  plant  (which  was  not 
supervised), and hence no intentionality can be imputed to the action that contributed to 
bringing about a bad state of affairs.  
•  No  intentionality  may  be  recognized  in  the  action  even  under  conditions  of  perfect 
information about the employees’ labour conditions, because the company was not free to 
choose to improve the working conditions in the supplier’s plant, since it must remain 
competitive on the market, which in turn means that the best strategy is to reduce the costs 
of components acquired through the supply chain.   
•  No  causality  can  be  attributed  to  the  company’s  action  (even  if  it  is  aware  of  the 
consequences) because the abominable working conditions in the supplier’s plant would 
have been exactly the same had the company decided to cancel the supply contract, or not 
to conclude it at all. Given the ongoing competitive conditions of the market, another 
company would have been induced to buy similar components at exactly at the same price 
conditions from the same supplier. 
Similarly, individual citizens disclaim all responsibility for the depletion of natural resources 
or their insufficient contribution to the provision of local public goods (such as a reduction in 
pollution,  energy  saving  and  greenhouse  emission  reduction  programs,  insufficient 
participation  in  responsible  consumption  initiatives  etc.)  by  denying  that  some  of  the 
conditions  for  attributing  responsibility  are  satisfied  in  the  case  in  point.  For  instance, 
pollution is an unintended collective composition effect of the decisions of many individuals, 
whereas each of them takes his/her individual decision whilst bearing in mind a personal goal 
or intended outcome that is completely different from the composition effect. Thus there is no 
intentionality. Moreover, no causality on the composition outcome can be imputed because 
each individual action makes only a minute contribution to the global outcome. The same 
would be the case even without the contribution of the single individual. 
Of course, many of these claims can be rebutted simply by a more accurate consideration of 
the  conditions  for  attributing  responsibility.  For  example,  it  could  be  stressed  that  the 
company  voluntarily  decided  not  to  supervise  the  supplier’s  plant,  and  that  in  general  it 
cannot pretend that it was unaware that labour conditions cannot be anything but poor in 
similar  factories  at  that  price  level.  Moreover,  the  decision  to  remain  competitive  on  the 
market by carrying out these kinds of cost-saving policies is an intentional and deliberate 
choice concerning one’s ultimate professional goals, just like any other. Thus the entrepreneur 

cannot disavow responsibility for the consequences of that deliberate decision as if the action 
had been carried out under duress (“it must necessarily remain efficient on the market in order 
that the cost-saving policy automatically follows”).   
Finally, the market structure in the relationship between the supplier and the buyer is probably 
not “perfectly” competitive. The buyer decided to relocate to that plant the production of 
components that it previously made itself in its home country. There was probably something 
like an exclusive contract that ‘locked’ the supplier into a privileged business relationship 
with the buyer because the latter was the former’s only client for that specialized component, 
which amounted to the largest part of the plant’s production. There was something like a 
bilateral duopoly situation between the two parties, under which the buyer had the strongest 
bargaining position. Since the company had bargaining power over the supplier, if the buyer 
wanted, it could have demanded that working conditions be improved in the plant, perhaps at 
the same time permitting the supplier to take advantage of improved contractual conditions. 
But by contrast, the company exploited its bargaining power (for example, the threat not to 
honour an incomplete contract) with the goal of reaping as much of the surplus resulting from 
the exchange as possible. Given the part of the surplus left to the supplier, the latter could not 
do a great deal to improve labour conditions at the plant.   
For  private  citizens,  responsibility  disclaimers  can  be  rejected  on  the  grounds  that  the 
individual cannot claim not to be aware that the cumulative outcome of many individual 
actions, even if prima facie aimed at different goals, ultimately results in the depletion of a 
natural resource or an environmental common good. Moreover, at least at the level of local 
public goods or commons, the contribution of one single agent may not be miniscule and may 
not make a negligible contribution to the causation of a suboptimal outcome. In fact, the 
situation resembles more a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma or a free-rider problem with a 
finite number of players than the pure public good paradox involving an infinite number of 
agents.   
All  this  only  proves  that  individual  responsibility c a n  b e  e x p a n d e d  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  s o c i a l  
outcomes that are partly within the discretionary range of certain private agents. It should in 
fact  be  noted  that  every  rebuttal  of  a  responsibility  disclaimer  refers  to  the  existence  of 
conditions  in  such  a  way  such  that  the  disclaiming  individual  nevertheless  retains  some 
discretion over a social outcome, and hence he/she can be attributed responsibility for that  
state of affairs. However nothing has been said thus far about the possibility that individuals 

may share so c ia l re sp on sib ilitie s f o r  th e  imp le me n ta tio n  o f  certain  desirable  social  goals 
(welfare objectives or norms) decided at the level of a collective body or society at large.   
2.2. From individual to shared responsibility 
Defining  shared  social  responsibilities  requires  the  identification  of  a  collective  body  (a 
group, the society) that shares social welfare goals or principles of social justice among its 
members,  exercises  intentionality  in  pursuing  them,  and  also  has  causal  force  over  the 
determination of states of affairs that are consistent with such intentions. It is also necessary 
to have an argument which proves that, starting from a goal or a set of principles shared by a 
collective  body,  responsibility  for  that  goal  or  those  principles  can  be  allocated  to  its 
members,  such  that  they  share  responsibility  for  fulfilling  the  goal  or  principles  of  the 
collective entity.  
Before discussing how this step can be achieved, let me try to define a view of society that 
can legitimate the idea that there is something like a shared social responsibility among its 
members, or that suggests that individuals share responsibility for some social situation in 
terms of a goal or a set of principles established on societal level
Shared  responsibility s e e m s  t o  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  d u t y  t o  b e h a v e  a c c o r ding  to  certain 
principles  or  goals  that  are  of  value  along  with  other  agents ( c i t i z e n s ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
institutions) and/or to pursue the achievement of some common goals or states of affairs. It 
suggests treating (European) society as a cooperative venture for the mutual advantage of its 
members (Rawls 1971). In order to support the continuous participation and contribution of 
all its individual members, such an entity must be grounded on agreed principles of social 
justice concerning the production and distribution of primary goods and basic capabilities 
(Sen 2009) necessary for the well-being of all its member citizens.  
When these principles are agreed to, and hence shared by the citizens, this entails that they 
are responsible to behave in accordance with these principles. This may be interpreted as a 
shared responsibility borne by them (even though it is differentially allotted between them), 
their private organizations and associations, companies and firms, and public institutions on 
different levels. From this perspective, shared responsibility means that public authorities, 
citizens, non-profit and for-profit organizations and their stakeholders  are included within 
areas of responsibility under the terms of some principle or standard of social justice and 
welfare, and that collective action or the generation of a social outcome is required. Different 

outcomes associated with the notion of social cohesion may be the object of agreements and 
may flow from the agreement process properly defined. 
To  be  precise  therefore,  shared  social  responsibilities  require  (as  a  prerequisite  for  their 
allocation) that corresponding duties be identified and attributed to members of society (or 
some relevant subset of it) because they are derived from values or goals that are shared by 
the  same  members  understood  as  a  collective  body  and  who  have  made  a  choice  (an 
agreement)  about  them.  At  the  same  time,  the  members  of  society  must  also  be  able  to 
discharge  these  responsibilities  effectively  according  to  the  conditions  establishing  their 
responsibility: viz. their capacity to act, to have causal force, and to exercise some degree of 
intentionality. In other words, the merely formal assignment of duties from an independent 
‘collective’ level may not be effective in engendering true responsibility if the members of the 
collective do not perceive themselves as having the capacity as agents to agree on those duties 
and hence to discharge the duties from which their responsibilities stem.   
Since a number of paradoxes of collective action (such as the Free Rider problem or the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma) that sever the link between collective moral goals or principles and the 
individual’s  actual  capacity  to  accomplish  the  corresponding  duties  are  well  known,  the 
conditions for the effective ascription of shared social responsibility remain problematic. To 
summarize the paradoxes for the benefit of the reader, let us consider first the Free Rider 
problem. Many players participate in collective action for the provision of a public good. 
When some amount of the public good is provided its consumption by some individual does 
not make physically impossible that the same amount also benefits other individuals (what 
entails non rivalry in consumption), whilst participation in production or paying a price for 
the good cannot be a basis for claiming a special exclusive stance for the appropriation of a 
share of the public good, since nobody can be excluded from benefiting from it (i.e. non-
excludability from consumption, for example by imposing a price).  However participation, 
even where minimal, amounts to a cost for the individual participant. Thus, each individual 
member of the relevant group, by acting on the basis of his/her mere rational self-interest, will 
decide to abstain from effective participation in the collective action, since by this individual 
strategy (no  participation)  s/he nevertheless still has access to the fruits of the collective 
action, and at the same time s/he dispenses her/himself from bearing the cost. Since none may 
predict the case in which s/he is determinant in reaching a threshold of participants in the 
collective action which is necessary for the good provision, this individual decision is not 

conditional on the prediction of how many people will participate in the collective action. 
Consequently, participation should come to an end and  the  public  good  provision  should 
disappear.  
The Prisoners’ Dilemma is an even more skeletal instance of strategic interaction. At least 
two players may gain a mutual benefit from reciprocal cooperation, but in the event that one 
fails  to  cooperate,  while  the  other  plays  his/her  part,  the  former  will  fare  much  better. 
Moreover, where the other player does not cooperate, it would not make sense for either 
player  to  cooperate,  since  it  is  more  beneficial  to a d o p t  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g y  o f  n o n -
cooperation as well, whereas cooperating would subject the player to unilateral exploitation 
by the counterpart. Whatever the predicted behaviour of the other party, non-cooperation is 
the  best  strategy  for  each  player,  assuming  that  each  reasons  from  the  perspective  of 
individually rational self-interest. The  paradox lies in the fact that , while non-cooperation is 
the dominant strategy for both players, the resulting outcome for both of them is worse than 
the outcome that would obtain had they both decided to cooperate against their rational self-
interest.   
These ‘social dilemmas’ (Ostrom) typically lead individual agents to disavow their individual 
responsibility for the collective harm which is the outcome of their interaction. Even though 
their  actions  are  intentional  and  they  exercise  (together  with  other  agents’  actions)  some 
casual  power  over  the  social  outcome,  agents  fail  to  see  the  rationale  for  accepting 
responsibility for the failure to achieve the socially optimal outcome. In the Free Rider case 
each agent argues that her/his individual contribution cannot by itself make the difference in 
the provision of the public good. The player could only accomplish the task through success 
in coordinating a large number of contributors. But according to rational self-interest, no other 
player will contribute. Therefore it is not the case that he/she may be attributed responsibility 
for the failure to bring about the social optional outcome.  
Even though the causal role of the individual player in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is much 
more  relevant  in  determining  the  outcome,  he/she  follows  similar  line  of  reasoning  in 
declaiming his/her responsibility for the failure  to achieve the Pareto optimal outcome of 
reciprocal cooperation.  He cannot avoid recognizing that the suboptimal outcome is the joint 
responsibility  of  both  the  payers.    Nevertheless,  since  non-cooperation  is  the  dominant 
strategy for both of them, there will be no chance for him to predict that other players will 
coordinate in order to achieve the cooperative outcome. By acting unilaterally each can only 

generate a situation of unilateral exploitation to his/her own disadvantage  – but of course 
putting him/herself in the situation of falling prey to unilateral exploitation may go far beyond 
his/her reasonable obligations. 
These arguments do not provide a valid refutation of the players’ individual responsibility in 
determining the social harm.  But what matters here is whether there is also a solid basis for 
making an argument in favour of accepting individual responsibility for bringing about the 
social good. ‘Ought implies can’, but as long as the behaviour of other players is determined 
according to the requirements of the standard theory of rational self-interest, the player cannot 
modify the suboptimal outcome through his/her individual decision, and thus he/she cannot 
feel responsible for not having satisfied an ‘ought’ which goes beyond the reach of his/her 
individual decision.   
Quite obviously, the demand for responsibility may  be shifted to a different level, viz. the 
responsibility for favouring a change in the form of the game played or in the rules whereby 
the  same  game  is  played.
3 T h i s  w o u l d  a l l o w  f o r  s o m e  c o o r d i n a t i n g  me c h a n i s m ,  credible 
cooperative  agreement  or  the  availability  of  additional  sanctions  against  non  cooperative 
behaviour such that players could agree on a joint plan of action permitting a different social 
outcome. Thereafter, individual responsibility could be predicated on the individual’s decision 
to carry out an individual  action that concurs with other agents in order to determine the best 
social  outcome.  In  sum,  individual  responsibility  can  be  rejected  as  far  as  each  player 
perceives him/herself (i) as an individual agent that makes his/her best individual decision 
given a rational prediction of the other agents’ non cooperative behaviour, and not (ii) as a 
component of a collective agency unit that settles (and is committed to) a common goal and 
undertakes  the  action  consistent  with  pursuit  of  the  goal  itself.  In  particular,  the  PD’s 
individual  players  fail  to  recognize  their  responsibility  for  cooperation  until  there  is  no 
identification with an agency unit , a collective goal or a shared principle requiring that both 
players play the game according to the joint strategy (cooperate, cooperate) . 

Different approaches have been proposed over decades of research into game theory, which may be formulated 
in terms of suggestions to the players : ‘play the game repeatedly so to allow reputation effects’,  ‘change  the 
given rules of the game so to pass from a non-cooperative to a cooperative game’, ‘insert the game in a meta-
game where rules for playing  a particular game can be chosen within a larger game’, ‘allow deciding on rules 
for playing the game’, ‘introduce a pre-play (apparently) cheap talk stage in which player may make an 
agreement under the  veil of ignorance on the game’s  rules, and then see what happens to their preferences in 
the ensuing  game’, and finally (as discussed in the main text) ‘trigger the frame “We” to bring it to the players’ 
minds,  and then let the players play the game as a group’

A highly effective way of explaining the shift from collective values to individual duties and 
responsibility within such social dilemmas is suggested by the theory of “We Thinking” and 
“Team  Reasoning”  (Bacharach  1999,  2006,  Sugden  2000,  2003,  Tuomela  1995).  Team 
reasoning, according to Bacharach in particular, requires the following premises: for each 
individual member of a group, it is true that s/he knows (and s/he knows that every other 
individual member also knows) that (i) s/he is a member of the group, (ii) the group has a 
goal, (iii) every member of the group identifies with the group and hence takes the  group’s 
goal as her/his own goal, (iv) there is a joint action that satisfies the group’s goal better than 
any other, and members of the group calculate it; (v) from that calculation each member 
knows the individual action which is the projection of the common action onto the individual 
strategy set of each player - i.e. the part of the collective action that is under the control of 
each individual player. It then follows that each individual member knows that s/he should 
carry out the individual action as the component under her/his control of the collective action 
satisfying the group’s goal. Moreover, according to the same authors, this inference is a mere 
piece of valid reasoning according to the logic of ‘successful instrumental rationality’ – that 
is, it does not presuppose any further condition other than the above plus logic (see Bacharach 
2006) .  
The key assumption behind team reasoning is group identification, which entails that for each 
individual there is a cognitive change in the understanding of the unit of agency.  It is no 
longer the individual but the group as such that is considered as the agent. Once the agency 
unit has changed, the individual’s goal (or payoff function) changes. S/he no longer identifies 
her/his  objective-function  with  her/his  own  personal u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  I n s t e a d ,  h e r / h i s  
objective-function  is  now  identical  with  the  objective-function  representing  the  common 
interest of the group: that is, henceforth the individual takes the group’s goal as the premise 
for her/his practical reasoning.   
The conclusion as to what each individual should do follows as a simple valid inference 
according to the logic of practical reasoning. Since the group’s goal is her/his own goal, and 
since collective action is the best way of achieving that goal, and moreover since s/he is able 
to infer from that action (a vector of individual actions) the projection onto the action set of 
each individual (the vector component belonging to each individual), then the individual must 
know that her/his best way of satisfying her/his goal (i.e. the group goal) is to implement 
her/his component of the collective action. Therefore s/he should carry out this action.    

From this it is only a small step towards responsibility: the individual who team reasons can 
recognize that s/he has been attributed responsibility for the performance of her/his collective 
action component. If s/he team reasons, s/he also understands that s/he can be praised or 
blamed  from  the  group’s  point  of  view  for  having  played  or  not  played  her/his  part  in 
implementing the collective action conducive to the group’s goal.    
It should however be noted that team reasoning is not valid in general but only contingently.  
It is based on a matter pertaining to cognitive social psychology – identification – which is not 
necessary but contingent in itself. An ever possible alternative in fact is that the individual 
does not identify with the group and continues to see himself as the unit of agency.  
What  triggers  group  identification  according  to  Bacharach  is  the  cognitive  psychological 
mechanism of ‘framing’. If the individual enters the “We” frame, then he will see the group as 
the unit of agency, and the rest of the team reasoning will follow. But if he remains within, or 
enters into, the “I” frame, he will see himself as the unit of agency and the logics that he will 
follow will be the canons of typical strategic reasoning used in game theory (albeit subject to 
some  rationality  bound).  In  this  case,  the  logical  consequences  are  the  collective-action 
paradoxes, or (so to speak) the typical calculation of an individually dominant strategy in the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma that leads to the collective suboptimal outcome (i.e. agents individually 
do not discharge their responsibility toward the collective goal).  
Neither framing is unique or voluntary: it happens that a frame comes to the individual’s 
mind. But it may also occur that another frame emerges – in the same way as the adoption of 
some (internally consistent but mutually exclusive) alternative way of perceiving things is 
always possible given certain figures according to Gestalt Psychologie. If it is the case that 
the “We” frame comes to the individual’s mind, then it circumscribes the reasoning that the 
individual can implement given what he can see and account for within the bounds of that 
frame. For example he does not keep a mental account of the rational opportunity of unilateral 
defection in the Prisoners’ Dilemma because this is not rational within that frame, where he 
identifies with the group’s goal and hence strives to achieve the ‘cooperative’ outcome (which 
is the best outcome from the team’s point of view). When however the “I” frame comes to the 
individual’s mind, then he reasons in terms of the individual’s best response and hence is 
perfectly capable of accounting for the decision to defect as a rational individual action with 
respect to his present goal (to maximize his personal utility).  

Triggering the “We” frame is therefore essential for the effectiveness of team reasoning. Even 
if framing is contingent and not voluntary, a given frame is triggered by some clue or salient 
element occurring in the situation and that attracts the individual’s attention through some 
experience that helps the relevant frame to come to the individual’s mind. And this occurs 
exactly at the same time that another  frame for the same situation is still available. This 
should  be  borne  in  mind  when  seeking  to  understand  the  implications  for  shared 
responsibility. 
In fact, on this view, responsibility follows the same route as team reasoning. If the “We” 
frame comes to my mind, I will identify with the group goal, which results in my duty to play 
my part in the collective action that is instrumental to that goal, assuming that it is calculable. 
Moreover,  if  this  is  the  case  for  all  the  members  of  the  group,  they  will  all  share  the 
responsibility to play their part in achieving the group’s goal. Thus each individual shares the 
goal and hence shares responsibility for carrying out her component of the collective course 
of action conducive to the group’s goal. It follows that shared responsibility can be allocated 
to each group member who identifies with the group goal due to the fact that the “We” frame 
comes to her mind. 
However, it must be remembered that responsibility for the group’s goal can be shared only if 
the cognitive phenomenon of framing does indeed occur. Hence – assuming that Bacharach’s 
explanation  of  team  reasoning  is  true  (what  is  not  completely  certain)  –  it  is  possible  to 
understand  how  challenging  it  is  to  satisfy  the  conditions  for  attributing  shared  social 
responsibility: what is needed is to discover on a social level what conditions/clues (so to 
speak) favour the adoption of the “We” frame.  
This must be the case not for the members of a single group alone (which would entail group 
responsibility but also parochialism); it is also necessary that the identical “We” frame be 
triggered for individuals belonging to different groups: for example, individuals belonging to 
different stakeholder categories and who are normally able to perceive themselves as distinct 
from other stakeholders because they have distinct sectional interests at stake (and different 
locations)  within  a  particular  decision  making  domain.  In  other  words,  what  should  be 
triggered are frames such as “We the society”, or some relevant part of it, “We the territory 
X”, “We the town Y”, “We Europe”, etc.  
This relates both to the ex ante identification with the collective and its objectives (which is 
not at all obvious given the existence of distributive conflicts between different stakeholders), 

and the ex post generation of the motivational forces that support execution of the individual 
action by each single agent. It may be useful to think of some sort of ‘law of conservation’ for 
the  sense  of  commitment n e e d e d  i n  t h e  m o v e  f r o m  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  c o l l e c tive  action 
(assuming  it  exists)  to  its  projection  onto  the  individual’s  action  (coinciding  with  the 
collective action component under the exclusive ‘responsibility’ of one particular agent). 
According to team reasoning, once the individual component of the best collective action has 
been calculated, and assuming  group identification, the second step should be a mere matter 
of valid reasoning (i.e. a syllogism). But we may doubt that this is the case (Sugden 2003). In 
addition to identification on the societal level with some common goal and principle, it is also 
necessary  for  the  causal  conditions  (cognitive  and  motivational)  that  give  us  the  specific 
impulse to carry out our individual component of the collective action (to play our part in it) 
to be satisfied. 
The idea suggested here is that activation of the “We” frame on the social level – resulting in 
shared  responsibility  for  the  common  goal  (with  its p r o j e c t i o n  o n t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o f  
responsibility to play one’s own part) – is dependent on whether it is possible to conduct the 
thought experiment of the “social contract under the veil of ignorance in an original position” 
(see Rawls 1971). Even though some moral philosophers would see this as a pure exercise of 
rational autonomy and hence as perfectly voluntary, from a social science point of view it 
must  be  admitted  that  it  conflicts  with  numerous  cognitive  biases  and  specific  particular 
interests (it is simple to say in theory, but difficult to implement in practice, when all the 
agent-related beliefs and motivations must be taken into account). It is therefore necessary to 
identify and accurately sketch out the institutional, organizational, cultural and governance-
related  conditions that constitute the potential social clues favouring the establishment in 
people’s minds of the relevant frame of “We the parties in the social contract”.  
The most challenging aspect of this task can be put as follows: identifying the conditions – 
those that affect beliefs and motivations – that allow for the preservation of the “We the 
society”  frame  (or  a  relevant  part  of  it)  when  the  agent  enters  a  decision  making  or 
interactional domain in which it is obvious that (a) carrying out an action in accordance with 
the common goal or principle is an individual choice, and (b) an individual decision to free 
ride on the shared responsibility is an open possibility - as is typical in compliance contexts. 
These challenges however go beyond the scope of this chapter (although see the related essay 
on  multi-stakeholder  governance,  Sacconi  2010,  infra).  Yet  before  identifying  these 

conditions, we have still to consider a preliminary question concerning the possibility of such 
a social contract from which the norms of shared social responsibility are derived, given the 
diversity of the interested parties’ claims and the stakeholders involved.   
3.  The multi-stakeholder agreement whence shared social responsibilities ensue 
 In order to bring about SSR, it is necessary to identify a collective unit of agency capable of 
establishing agreement on shared (among the members) principles and goals which can be 
transferred into the shared responsibility of each member not only during the deliberative 
stage  but  also,  and  principally,  during  the  stage  when  each  member  is  called  upon  to 
contribute to implementing those shared principles and goals. Here the “we thinking” mode of 
reasoning (and motivation) may play an important part (where there is one).  
The task is not easy. At whatever possible level of analysis, the relevant collective agency 
unit  will  consist  of  some  multi-level  (local,  regional,  national,  continental)  and  multi-
stakeholder group. In fact, without this multi-level and multi-stakeholder composition of the 
relevant group of agents called upon to share social responsibility, the word “shared” itself 
will be meaningless, or almost so. Complete homogeneity of the group of agents involved in 
sharing responsibility for a collective goal and action can be excluded even in the simplest 
representations of the problem provided by simple models of ‘social dilemmas’ – such as the 
Free  Rider  or  the  Prisoners’  Dilemma  games.  Even  in s u c h  a b s t r a c t  c o n t e x t s ,  w h e r e  t h e  
existence of a best joint action is obvious, there is in fact a conflict of interest (resulting in 
divergent actions). Each player prefers his/her individual defection over cooperation (or non-
contribution) once he/she expects that the other player will cooperate.  
However, when such an abstract and simple representation of the problem is accepted – which 
minimizes the scope for differences lying behind distributive conflicts – it may be conceded 
that there is a unique Pareto optimal course of collective action which collectively dominates 
over any other course of action and outcome.  Consequently, if reasoning in terms of what 
would be better for the players’ group as a whole is allowed, all agents belonging to the group 
will unanimously prefer that course of action and the corresponding outcome whereby they all 
“fare better” as a group. In the PD case this is of course the joint action consisting in the 
strategy pair (cooperation, cooperation). In the event of a ‘public good’ game, it is the joint 
level of contribution that maximizes the joint benefit of the public good provision net of the 
costs of its provision.  Hence, if the possibility to act in a cooperative and coordinated manner 

is assumed (i.e. the players consider their group to be an agency unit and they do not consider 
during the agreement stage that they could individually breach any agreement), it is quite 
obvious that all of the group’s members will agree to adopt such a plan of action and its 
outcome as their  common goal. The only problem persisting in this case would relate to 
“implementation”, which consists in the need to overcome the incentive to depart from the 
optimal collective course of action when it is realized at the implementation stage that, by 
cooperating, each member incurs a cost that he/she as an individual player could save by 
acting  opportunistically.  But  this  is  exactly  where the  “w e  th in k ing ” ca n  p lay  its r o le .  I t 
consists in assuring consistency for all the group members between the agreed collective plan 
and the individual course of action in the implementation stage.
4  
Nevertheless, when a less abstract perspective is taken on the SSR content, conflicts between 
different stakeholders’ interests are likely to emerge. This is moreover natural, given that 
claimsof a different nature may clash even if they are held by the selfsame individual at 
different  points  in  time  throughout  his/her  life,  so  as  to  classify  him/her  as  a  different 
stakeholder. (For example at different stages the same individual may be a young person who 
has  not  yet  entered  the  productive  life-stage  and  needs  skills  and  resources  to  do  so 
successfully, then a participant in a productive venture occupying a specific professional role 
and claiming recognition of her/his efforts, and finally a vulnerable person in need of health 
care).  
The  social  contract  is  suggested  as  an  answer  to  the  demand  for  a  cognitive  mechanism 
capable of providing the idea of  a group unit of agency and the ‘we’ frame that can solve the 
‘ought implies can’ problem underlying the allocation of shared responsibility.  The idea of 
the social contract must then satisfactorily deal with conflicting interests and different claims. 
Here I do not consider possible analytical developments in the idea of the social contract, 
which is deferred until a later chapter in this book (Sacconi 2011b, infra). Here I am only 
concerned with the possibility that stakeholders with different stakes and claims may agree to 
settle their shared obligations according to the moral priority  of  those different  stakes and 
claims. The focus is on the extent of moral legitimacy and priority that an impartial agreement 

Note that a compatible and perhaps more convincing explanation can be given by the idea of a  “sense of 
justice” (Rawls 1971), i.e. the idea that conformity preferences supporting voluntary compliance with an agreed 
principle of fairness, will develop when there is public knowledge that all the participants have endorsed the fair 
agreement and moreover it is  expected by all parties that all participants will reciprocate compliance with the 
agreement itself (Grimalda and Sacconi 2005, Sacconi and Faillo 2010, Sacconi 2011a). 


may grant to different stakes and claims, so that their ordered satisfaction may be translated 
into the ‘shared responsibility’ of all parties to the agreement. “Moral” is understood here in 
the contractarian sense as indicating an impartial and fair term of agreement. In other words, 
my  concern  here  is  with  the  core  idea  of  the  social c o n t r a c t  a s  a  r a t i o n a l  a n d  i m p a r t i a l  
agreement on principles of justice whereby stakeholders’ claims may be ordered according to 
certain priority principles.  
The discussion cannot yet be confined to the ‘ideal theory’ of the social contract, so that the 
subject matter of the agreement can be assumed to be already well defined due to the very 
nature  of  the  ‘original  position’  where  the  agreement  ideally  takes  place.  (For  example, 
according to Rawls, given the nature itself of the ‘original positions’, only ‘primary goods’ 
are  considered).  On  the  contrary,  we  must  admit  that  from  a  ‘non-ideal’  perspective, 
stakeholders called upon to share social responsibilities may bring both fundamental claims to 
the negotiating table (that is, basic rights over  primary  goods  and  basic  functioning)  and 
claims  that  seem  less  fundamental,  though  still  legitimate,  such  as  the  claim  for  the  fair 
remuneration of efforts devoted to whatever productive contribution to general wealth and 
welfare. In fact, it would be unrealistic to assume that these different claims are not staked in 
any real life situation where shared responsibilities for the accomplishment of some common 
goals are established.  
Moreover, from a ‘non-ideal’ perspective, the power of different stakeholders may be unequal 
and not necessarily aligned with the relative legitimacy and priority of their claims. What can 
thus  be  expected  is  that,  according  to  their  threatening  position,  those  stakeholders  who 
control the most valuable resources and are better organized and concentrated will control the 
group’s decision, and thereby affect the allocation of responsibility in a manner favourable to 
themselves. That is to say, they will shift some responsibility onto weaker stakeholders – by 
denying some of their legitimate claims – and at the same time disclaim responsibility for the 
most burdensome tasks or goals by emphasizing some other conflicting claim.  It is quite 
likely that large groups of people, characterized by a state of need concerning some basic 
good (i.e. education or civil rights protection) may, precisely because they are needy, not have 
resources to spend on political organization, while at the same time may  be so dispersed 
across a large territory as to render political coordination and organization difficult. At the 
same  time,  since  smaller  professional  or  business  groups  are  well  concentrated,  easy  to 
coordinate,  and  do  not  illegitimately  hold  highly  valuable  assets,  they  may  coalesce 

effectively in order to exercise their influence over public allocatory decisions. A reasonable 
view of the social contract that is capable of accommodating different claims on different 
levels would thus also have important consequences  in terms of the prerequisites for the 
design  of  an  institution  able  of  preventing  strong  but  illegitimate  (or  less  legitimate) 
stakeholders from exploiting the decision making process that resolves on the allocation of 
shared responsibility.  
The importance of this point cannot be overstated. If the agreement does not reflect the proper 
priority ordering of morally legitimate claims, it may fail to induce those who have the most 
urgent claims to identify with the group, thereby dooming the idea itself of ‘sharing’ social 
responsibility to failure. In fact, even though the capacity to take advantage of decisions on 
the allocation of responsibility may differ significantly, each stakeholder, whether strong or 
weak, has some strategy for avoiding proper compliance with its responsibility, perhaps by 
taking advantage of limited monitoring and control and concealing its behaviour.  
Put as simply as possible, the aim here is to propose an impartial acceptability test of the 
agreement whereby principles and goals are settled in order to assign responsibilities to each 
stakeholder. Stakeholders’ claims may be differentiated according to their level (the type of 
stakes)  or    –  within  the  same  type  or  level  –  according  to  the  degree  of  incompatibility 
between claims of the same type put forward regarding the distribution of a given set of 
scarce  goods  or  a  bundle  of  rights  over  scarce  resources,  control  over  which  may  be 
complementary only to  a very limited degree.  The idea of an agreement must be able to 
accommodate conflicts deriving from both of these two sources of differentiation, and what 
must be accomplished first is the priority ordering of stake-types or claim-levels whereby 
stakeholders may put forward their different and perhaps conflicting claims.  
4.  Different stakeholders’ claims  
In the following section three types of stakes or claim-levels put forward by stakeholders will 
be analyzed in sequence: need-based claims, merit-based claims and externality based claims.  
4.1. Need-based claims  
Here the interests at stake – and which prompt agents to stake claims – are conceived as needs 
for primary goods that are necessary in order for individuals to accomplish whatever life-plan 
they  may  have.  Moreover,  they  are  needs f o r  capabilities t o  t r a n s f o r m  s u c h  f u n d a m e n t a l  

goods into successful (or at least acceptable) functionings within some activity or sphere of 
human flourishing which is also consistent  with any life-plan. Such goods or capabilities 
enable individuals to achieve states of well-being understood as voluntary achievements of a 
level  of  decency  or  excellence  in  some  condition  or a c t i v i t y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  h o w  t h e y  a r e  
understood through the public use of reason and discussion in any given society. As is clear, 
this definition accommodates both Rawls’s and Sen’s views of well-being and justice (Sen 
2009), and also a mild Aristotelian interpretation of ‘functionings’. ‘Needs’, understood to be 
more basic than mere ‘desires’, can be identified as the means required by anyone in order to 
pursue any life-plan, or the capabilities that anyone needs in order to function successfully 
within a wide array of activities and conditions. When all individuals equally require the same 
primary  goods  or  capabilities  with  respect  to  any  life-plan  or  broad  array  of  basic 
functionings, it may be said that their needs are the same.  
Cardinal utility may be used as a measure of needs by significantly departing from standard 
utility theory, where it is defined as mere representation of subjective preferences. Utility in 
our  case  may  be  taken  as  a  measure  of  how  much  (technically)  a  good  or  capability  is 
“instrumental” for the life-plan of a given agent – i.e. as effectiveness measure of the relevant 
good or ‘capacity to function’  indispensability as a means to the end of accomplishing a life-
plan (or some part of it). Intuitively, ‘utility’ here means the extent to which a good is useful 
in order to achieve a goal, and in the event that a good or a capability were in many senses 
nearly indispensable as a means to reach the end of a life-plan, it could be said that they are 
‘needed’ for that plan, and hence their ‘utility’ (in an instrumental sense) are very high. This 
may  be  regarded  as  the  total  probability  associated w i t h  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  a  g i v e n  g o o d  o r  
‘capability to function’ may happen to be the effective means for accomplishing (in the sense 
of a means–end causation) the individually chosen life-plan across the various possible states 
of the world and situations in which it can be used (see Roemer 1996). Thus utility is a 
measure of the extent to which an agent needs a good or capability given his/her life-plan.  
Even though utility in this case is not a representation of subjective preferences, but stands for 
‘expected effectiveness’, it can still account for some of the diversity between individuals. 
Two individuals with different life-plans may have different instrumental utilities for certain 
primary goods or basic capabilities, according to the differences between their life-plans and 
the related differences in the probabilities that some good or capability will be an effective 
means for fulfilling those life-plans. Thus, if we ‘fine tune’ the analysis of the use of goods or 

capabilities as a function of the expected success in fulfilling different aspects of life-plans, 
any two individuals’ needs for the same goods or functionings may be different. However, 
since no acceptable realization of a life-plan can dispense with certain primary goods and 
basic capabilities to transform goods into basic functionings consistent with it, it follows that 
all agents equally need such primary goods and basic capabilities.  
Consequently,  these  individuals  also  have  similar  understandings  of  the  relationship  of 
instrumentality (or causality) between these means and the ultimate ends of life-plans, and 
hence  of  the  extent  to  which  a  person  will  need  these  goods  and  capabilities.  There  is 
therefore nothing to prevent an interpersonal measures of utility of these means from being 
agreed to in order that a common unit of measurement can be deployed to express the extent 
to which a given good or functioning can help achieve some aspect of the life-plan pertaining 
to any individual in general. Put differently, searching for a metric of the causal relationship 
(utility as usefulness in reaching some goal) between primary goods and functionings on the 
one  hand,  and  the  realization  of  the  ultimate  ends  of  life-plans  on  the  other,  does  not 
encounter the standard difficulties relating to interpersonal comparability that on the contrary 
arise when utility is defined as a measure of subjective preferences. Hence, given the life-
plans of two different individuals j and i, we can in principle say that some primary good or 
capability  has  more  utility  for  the  achievement  of  agent  j’s  life-plan  ends  than  for  the 
achievement of agent i’s life-plan ends. We are able to understand in interpersonal terms the 
extent to which a good or capability is instrumental to agent  j’s life-plan as against the extent 
to which it is instrumental to agent i’s life-plan. In other words, we can determine whether 
individual j needs a good or capability more than individual i (even if, in order to reach a 
decent  level of success in any life plan, primary goods and basic capabilities in general are 
needed in equal measure in order to accomplish both individual i’s and individual j’s  life-
plans).  
Formally, this relationship between the needs of different agents can be expressed in terms of 
relative needs: that is, as the ratio between the positive marginal variation of agent i’s  utility 
for a positive marginal increase in the use or possession of a given good or capability (in 
terms of variation in the degree of attainment of his/her life plan) and the negative marginal 
variation of agent j’s utility for the corresponding marginal decrease in the same good or 
capability used by agent j (in terms of variation in the attainment degree of agent j’s life-
plan). The greater the need of agent j (compared to agent i) for the good or ‘capability to 

function’ x, expressed in terms of its marginal utility for him/her, the greater will also be the 
marginal increase in its utility for him/her with respect to the marginal decrease in the utility 
of  agent j for the same good or capability x. We can thus estimate different distributions of 
primary goods or capabilities across different stakeholders in terms of those stakeholders’ 
relative needs for them (different distributions will be associated with different ratios of the 
marginal variations in utility for the agents).  
In order to be clear about the measurement of relative needs, let us assume that an  amount of 
a given primary good or ‘capability to function’ is fully distributed between two stakeholders, 
so  that  there  are  no  further  allocable  shares  that  can  further  enhance  the  utility  (needs 
satisfaction) of both the agents involved. In other words, by allocating the good or functioning 
capability we reach the Pareto-frontier (in economic jargon). Along this frontier only Pareto-
indifferent distributions can be found (i.e. allocations that may satisfy one stakeholder’s needs 
slightly more, but only at the cost of slightly reducing the satisfaction of another stakeholder’s 
needs).  
It  should  be  noted  that,  whilst  a  given  amount  of  some  primary  good  or  ‘capability  to 
function’  may  be  allocated  in  various  positive  shares  of  different  magnitudes  to  two 
stakeholders, when the Pareto-frontier is reached relative needs will react to these different 
allocations  by  different  marginal  increases  (or  decreases  respectively)  in  agent  i’s  utility 
compared to different marginal decreases (or increases respectively) in agent j’s utility. In 
fact, agents i and j can both gain as long as their shares can both be augmented – which may 
occur insofar as their shares can both be moved from some inferior status quo towards the 
Pareto  frontier  (where  all  the  different  allocations  of  the  entire  amount  available  are 
represented).  However,  once  this  frontier  has  been  reached,  only  trade-offs ( i n v o l v i n g  
conflicts of interests) between different stakeholders’ needs will be feasible.  
Nevertheless,  agreement  must  be  reached  on  some  distribution  located  along  the  Pareto 
frontier. A distribution according to the criterion of relative needs is the one that allocates 
goods and capabilities to stakeholders according to the proportion (inverse) resulting from the 
ratio between marginal variations in the agents’ utilities (needs) which is associated (along 
the Pareto frontier) with the allocation itself. 
5  This occurs in the locus of the Pareto frontier 

Although it may not be obvious, this condition is not trivial: given a unique measure of relative needs  (i.e. the 
inclination of the tangent to the Pareto frontier) , there is one single  proportion in the distribution of goods and 
capabilities  that can equate the relevant  ratio between the marginal variations of needs. Moreover, when the 
measure of relative needs changes continuously along a convex Pareto frontier, there is only one possible value 

where the Nash bargaining product is maximized, i.e. the point at which the multiplication of 
the stakeholders’ utilities – deriving from agreements  on  the  allocation  of  shares  –,  after 
deduction  of  what  they  would  have  gained  anyway  in  the  absence  of  any  agreement,  is 
maximized.  This,  in  fact,  is  the  mathematical  condition  for  a  ‘rational  solution’  of  the 
cooperative  bargaining  problem  over  the  distributions  of  primary  goods  or  capabilities 
between  different  (i.e.  at  least  two)  stakeholders  represented  through  utility-payoffs. 
Moreover it coincides with proportionality to relative needs (see fig.1).
6 It identifies a unique 
solution for the bargaining problem between stakeholders proposing need-based claims.  
Primary  goods  and  ‘capabilities  to  function’  may  be u n d e r s t o o d  a s  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  b a s i c  
citizenship rights. Thus, needs-based claims are the appropriate basis for the allocation of 
citizenship rights over scarce primary goods and entitlements to capabilities that enable an 
agent  to  use  goods  in  order  to  transform  them  into  achievements  of  some  relevant 
functionings.  In  order  to  give  every  stakeholder  equal  consideration  and  respect,  rights 
commanding control over such goods and capabilities must equate their needs; that is, in 
order to make them equal the distribution must be proportional to relative needs. But it has 
already been stated that, even though certain details of individual life-plans may differ, and 
hence may require some fine tuning in the distribution of goods and capabilities in relation to 
different individuals’ life-plans, primary goods and basic capabilities are nevertheless equally 
needed by every individual living under similar external (social, economic, technological and 
environmental) conditions. In fact, under similar conditions they are equally necessary for the 
appropriate  realization  of  all  life-plans.  Hence,  under  similar  conditions,  a  distribution  of 
rights (entitlements) between primary goods and basic capabilities that can be recognized as 







of this ratio of marginal needs that can be produced through a distribution of goods and capabilities according to 
a proportion reproducing the same  (inverse) ratio (see fig. 1 in the main text). 
As a matter of fact, the unique proportion of shares of goods and capabilities that may be allocated in order to 
equate the ratio of marginal variations of needs occurs at exactly the place on the Pareto frontier where the Nash 







(Fig. 1. Nash Bargaining Solution of a two-player cooperative bargaining game in the event of a 
symmetrical payoff space P. The point selected on the Pareto frontier maximizes the multiplication of 
the players’ utility differences (Ui – di
*); the bisector starting from the status quo d* allocates payoffs 
(representing needs for goods and capabilities) according to a ratio  - a1/a2 - identical to the ratio 
∂U1/∂U2 of marginal utilities (relative needs) represented by the inclination of the tangent to the 
frontier exactly at the point where the Nash bargaining product is maximized. Hence, by selecting the 
point where the Nash bargaining product is maximized, the distribution of payoffs is also proportional 
to relative needs. See Brock 1978/9) 
 
4.2.  Merit-based claims.  
In this case, interests at stake are understood according to the ‘interest in gaining access to 
some  benefit  in  proportion  to  one’s  personal  contribution  or  effort’.  Merit  is  therefore 
understood simply as contribution to some social surplus. The claim to a share of surplus is 
fair insofar as it reflects a personal contribution.  
Moral merit is not invoked here, because it is an empty notion that must be defined according 
to some further moral concept. For example, someone may morally deserve a share in a given 










Merit-based claims may also implicitly refer to talent or natural endowment with some skill 
and biological capability, since it is obvious that talent affects the capability to contribute or 
to produce effort at a lower psychological cost. Unless remunerations are to be proportional to 
the  ‘pain’  of  producing  effort,  merit-claims  may  therefore  consist  in  claims  to  higher 
remuneration for more talented persons (otherwise, were it the ‘pain’ of putting effort into a 
job that is considered important, then -- assuming an equal level of effort -- talented persons 
would  be  paid  less  than  untalented  ones  because  producing  the  same  effort  level    would 
“cost” the talented person  less  “pain” than the untalented one).  
However, an implicit reference to talents does not seem to provide a sound foundation for 
meritocracy.  Rawls’s  (1971)  criticism  of  talent-based  principles  of  justice  is  compelling: 
talents are the fruit of a morally arbitrary natural (and socio-biological) lottery, and nobody 
can claim either to deserve her/his natural talents or to possess any merit for ‘having been 
given’  such  talents.  Hence,  if  the  casual  distribution  of  talents  were  reproduced  by  the 
distribution of goods or rights, also the final distribution of outcomes and the corresponding 
social structure would become morally arbitrary. 
Insofar as talent affects the natural endowment of capabilities, it seems to interfere with the 
distribution of capabilities according to needs. Assume that basic goods and capabilities are 
distributed according to relative needs. Then the people who are most talented have the least 
need  for  capabilities.  They  should  therefore  receive  less,  so  that  a  wide  distribution  of 
capabilities  according  to  relative  needs  could  attempt  to  level  out  these  differences  in 
capabilities  by  giving  more  primary  goods  and  learnable  capabilities  to  the  less  talented. 
However this egalitarian redistribution of capabilities seems idealistic and unreal. There is 
probably no way, at least in the short-run, to equalize natural capability endowments through 
their redistribution, even when needs constitute the basic criterion for allocating entitlements 
over resources that can be used to ‘learn’ capabilities.  
Moreover, the exploitation of talents must be incentivized through some reward for their use 
and cultivation. At the same time, inequalities resulting from the exploitation of talents would 
be unjustified unless such exploitation were justified by some principle. This is the reason 
why  a  regulation  of  inequalities  generated  through  the  differential  exercise  of  talents  is 
required according to a principle of justice such as the Rawlsian ‘difference principle’. Since 
inequalities that result directly from talents are not justifiable, even if some reward may be 
causally necessary to incentivize their use and cultivation, the differential remuneration due to 

talents may be based only on the benefits for all resulting from their use (including the worst-
off). Since inequalities incentivizing the use of talents favour the talented, the only relevant 
criterion by which to decide on the magnitude of these inequalities is the extent to which they 
affect  the  position  of  the  worst-off.  Thus,  the  maximum  deviation  from  equality  that  is 
acceptable for incentivizing the use of talents and their cultivation is that associated with the 
maximization of the absolute level of the satisfaction of the needs of the worst-off, and hence 
the overall capacity to contribute to mutual benefit (not just the talented’s benefit). Any wider 
inequality is unacceptable.
7  Thus there cannot be any  justification on talent grounds (for 
example  the  talent  in  using  financial  tools)  for  the  huge  increase  in  social  inequalities 
throughout the world over the last three decades.  This is certainly the case for developed 
countries such as the US, the UK, Ireland and Italy, as well as most of the developing ones – 
with particular reference to managerial bonuses  and shareholder returns compared against 
average  wages.  To  summarize,  only  contributions,  and  not  talents,  can  be  regarded  as  a 
further legitimate source for claims to shares in some social surplus.   
Contributions  are  given  to  coalitions  of  agents  that  jointly  produce  marketable  goods 
(enterprises)  or  that  through  collective  action  provide  some  universal  public  goods,  local 
public  goods,  commons  or  club  good.  These  are  cooperative  activities  that  often  involve 
specific investments by their participants. ‘Specific investments’ are decisions to specialize in 
some asset or resource in order subsequently to increase its value within a given specific 
bilateral exchange or transaction. Such investments are sunk costs which are not recoverable 
outside a specific relationship. They create a reciprocal (but not symmetrical) relationship of 
dependence  for  mutual  advantage.  They  may  have  different  natures:  human  capital  may 
become more specialized by learning specific techniques, languages or codes of behaviour. 
Creative and inventive work entails the specific investment of human capital in a specific 
project before any result can be achieved. If the worker is removed from the project before the 
result is obtained, the sunk cost of all of the preparatory activity – which is essential for the 
invention – cannot be recovered by embarking on another project. Specialist training may be a 
specific  investment,  but  even  workers  who  are  not  highly-skilled  may  carry  out  specific 
investments, sunk costs and idiosyncratic work relations – for example immigrant workers are 
idiosyncratically locked into specific employment relationships if a breach of their contract of 

This is a moral inference of  the distributive ‘difference principle’ from  a more basic idea of moral equality; 
for a different ‘game theoretical’ deduction see Binmore 2005 and Sacconi 2010a 

employment  may  entail  their  expulsion  from  the  country  and  the  loss  of  their  sunk 
immigration costs. Specific investments may also be made by the providers of services and 
technologies  specifically  dedicated  to  the  productive  process  of  their  client’s  firm  or 
organization. Financial risk capital may be idiosyncratically invested in the acquisition and 
development of technologies, plant and equipment so that their costs cannot be recovered 
before  some  long  period  of  production  activity  has  elapsed.  Social  capital,  i.e.  fiduciary 
relations and trust, is a specific investment that cannot be useful outside a given relation-
network, and so if an entrepreneur, worker or consumer endowed with high social capital is 
expelled from his/her relation-network, then his/her social capital will also be significantly 
devalued,  and  consequently  so  too  all  of  his/her  trust-based  transactions.  Consumers  also 
invest  specifically  in  research,  information  gathering  and  relation-building  in  order  to 
establish idiosyncratic relationships with professionals who are selected in order to establish a 
long-term service relationship based on trust (consider the cases of doctors and lawyers, but 
also financial, banking and insurance professionals).  
Specific investments are often multilateral, complementary and conducive to team production. 
The typical feature of team production is that by increasing the number of contributors who 
join a coalition and make specific investments, the coalition’s productivity will increase more 
than proportionally. In other words, the production function is super-additive. Moreover, the 
team’s additional surplus compared to the alternative scenario of separate production cannot 
be ascribed to any particular individual and split into separate shares attributable to any of 
them, because it is only the cooperative interaction within the team that makes the surplus 
possible.  Thus  the  good  side  of  team  production  is  that  cooperation  between  the  team 
members produces more than the sum of their separate activities. The surplus (or parts of it) 
cannot be attributed to any of the team members, but only allocated to the group as a whole. 
However, there is also a problematic side: because there is no separable measure of personal 
productivity,  it  is  impossible  to  remunerate  individuals  in  such  a  way  that  reflects  their 
personal contributions. When an individual’s contribution cannot be separated and rewarded 
as  such,  opportunistic  behaviour  may  arise  within  the  team,  without  being  detected  and 
directly sanctioned. Given a suboptimal collective output with respect to the potential best 
joint output, it is impossible to say who has contributed efficiently and who has not; and it is 
also  impossible  to  pay  team  members  in  proportion  to  their  actual  individual  marginal 
productivities.  

However, to assert that productivity and contributions are joint and investments are specific 
and  complementary  is  not  to  imply  that  there  is  no  measure  of  how  much  individuals 
contribute to cooperation. In fact, the contribution of any additional member is the marginal 
variation of the coalition’s value as a function of each new additional member who joins the 
coalition. Put simply: this is not a measure of the separable contribution of any particular 
member and cannot be attributed only to his/her merit. Exactly the same marginal increase of 
surplus can in fact be observed also by reversing the order in which individuals join the team 
– so that by interchange the ‘marginal individual’ joining the team according to any order, the 
same increase in team productivity will still result. In other words, whoever is marginally 
added to a given team dimension will induce the same marginal variation of the coalition 
value. This means that all the group members can be allocated responsibility for any variation 
of  the  team  value.  Thus  their  contributions  are  equal.  Summing  up,  a  measure  of  the 
individual’s  overall  expected  contribution  is  the  marginal  variation  of  the  value  of  each 
coalition that he/she may enter as a member (in whatever order) multiplied by the probability 
that any coalition structure will occur, assuming that each member’s contribution is equal 
when specific investments are multilateral and complementary because it is equally essential 
for the surplus as a whole. 
Contribution-based claims – understood as both individual contributions and team production 
contributions – are legitimate claims to shares of the wealth surplus created by cooperative 
ventures in companies, organizations and collective action in the production of marketable 
private goods or public or quasi-public non-marketable goods (club goods, local commons 
etc.). The moral basis for these claims is simply that whoever participates in the production of 
a given surplus should receive a share in proportion to his/her contribution to its production. It 
is then intuitive that many apparently ‘meritocratic’ reward systems that bring about large 
inequalities in developed and developing countries cannot be justified on the basis of the 
‘proportionality to contribution’ principle. In fact there is no reason to think that the tenfold or 
greater  multiplication  of  the  remuneration  differentials  between  CEOs    and  the  average 
employees  in  the  typical  capitalist  company  over  the  last  two  or  three  decades  has  been 
related to a proportional increase in the top managers’ efforts or their personal contributions 
to the overall value created by the company compared to the contribution provided by typical 
employees (which would have decreased in proportion tenfold or more). Nor there is any 
evidence to support the belief that the largest remuneration differentials and highest bonuses 

paid to top managers occur in companies where the shareholder value has increased most in 
the long run.  
There is also a theoretical reason for not believing that the striking growth in inequalities and 
pay  differentials in many  companies has any  relationship to any notion of merit.  In fact, 
incentive mechanisms – such as bonuses and stock options – introduced  in order to link 
managers’ remunerations to share-value performance, are based on the realistic hypothesis 
that  information  held  by  principals  and  agents  is  asymmetric.  Thus  assessing  managers’ 
contributions directly in terms of observation of their behaviour and efforts is impossible for 
their  principals.  Managers  hold  private  information o n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  a n d  h e n c e  c a n n o t  b e  
rewarded on the basis of their own reports of their efforts. For this reason, managerial pay is 
based  on  financial  outcomes  which  are  only  probabilistically  and  indirectly  correlated  to 
unobservable effort. Share value is taken as an indirect proxy indicator of the consequences 
on shareholder equity of managers’ behaviour and efforts. But it should be noted that in order 
to encourage managers to work harder, rather than adopting a line of managerial slack  in 
situations  with higher productivity, an outcome-based remuneration structure must pay them 
more for different outcomes that would occur with exactly the same effort level, but under 
different exogenous productivity conditions. When high effort under unfavourable exogenous 
productivity  conditions  produces  the  same  output  as l o w  e f f o r t  u n d e r  g o o d  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
conditions, only this kind of incentive may encourage a manager to choose high effort under 
good  conditions  in  order  to  obtain  the  best  output. B u t  t h i s  i n v o l v e s  p a y i n g  d i f f e r e n t  
compensation for the same effort (merit). Premiums paid for better outcomes constitute an 
‘information rent’ that managers are able to extract by threatening not to make an effort when 
it is impossible to distinguish between cases of high effort under unfavourable productivity 
conditions from those of low effort under favourable productivity conditions. Thus, according 
to an honest reading of economic theory, the level of bonuses and financial incentives paid is 
proportional to the managers’ threat to resort to opportunist and lazy behaviour when their 
efforts cannot be directly  measured. However, the principle “to each  according to his/her 
threat power and informative advantage” sounds quite different from “to each according to 
his/her contribution (merit)”.  
4.3.  Externality based claims 

Interests in this case are claims to redress for social costs and externalities that spill over onto 
stakeholders – individuals, groups or entire communities – as the external cumulative effects 
of multiple individual decisions. 
Externalities  originate  from  the  interference  of  market  transactions  with  the  allocation  of 
public  or  common  goods,  or  failures  of  collective  actions  aimed  at  their  production  or 
preservation. Basically, they occur according to the logic of the Free Rider: one or both of the 
parties  to  a  market  transaction  may  consume  some  public  or  common  resource,  thereby 
generating social costs (i.e. external to the transaction) that spill over onto third parties – or 
also onto the parties themselves insofar as they are interested in concluding their transaction 
within certain constraints on the consumption of common resources (excessive consumption 
generates a social cost while reducing the private costs borne by participants in a particular 
market transaction). Some participants in collective action aimed at the maintenance of a 
public good or a common may refrain from playing their part, profiting unfairly from the 
other parties’ contributions. But also in a purely private domain, some members of a team 
may  exploit  the  unverifiability  of  individual  contributions  to  team  production  in  order  to 
refrain from more efficient efforts, so as to gain advantages from the other members’ work.   
The main source of difficulty where there is a large number of actors involved in decisions 
giving rise to an externality is that it is a cumulative effect that spills over onto other agents, 
or onto the same agents, although these decisions are not intended to induce such effects, but 
are instead aimed at gaining profit from a private transaction involving only a subset of the 
externality’s stakeholders (regarded as participants in a private exchange). Since externalities 
are the cumulative effects of many decisions, the individual agent may not recognize his/her 
causal power over them. In actual fact, the decision may be deliberately intended to yield 
some advantage from an apparently ‘freely available’ resource or an opportunity to reduce 
costs. But because the individual decision is not directly intended to achieve that cumulative 
effect, the agent may not recognize the intentional nature of the decision contributing to the 
cause of the external effect. Hence the individual agent will disavow any responsibility for it. 
This  difficulty  is  even  greater  when  an  externality m a y  b e  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  d e c i s i o n s  
whereby some merit claim is met in a parallel domain (private production of some marketable 
good). Moreover, needs-based claims may already have been met for the same common or 
public good in the past, so that the externality subsequently interferes only with its marginal 

use or enjoyment by third parties, without calling the entire basic entitlement on such goods 
into question. Thus the infringement of needs principles of justice is not apparent.   
The sharing of social responsibility for these claims is not immediate, since those who are 
typically responsible for externalities do not perceive  themselves  as  the  relevant  decision 
makers. Indeed, these claims are not usually raised within a process of collective decision 
making concerning cooperative joint action, such as when a primary good must be distributed 
or a coalition must be formed to develop and exploit it. But it is under these circumstances 
that agents may accept a “we frame” as cooperators. Externality, on the contrary, emerges 
only as an unintentional interference with the implementation of these decisions. Externality-
claims must be brought against individuals participating in a market decision who do not 
regard  themselves  as  involved  in  decisions  concerning  needs  and  the  reproduction  or 
development of public goods or commons, and who  prima facie disclaim their responsibility 
for them.  
Overall, however, these situations obviously make distribution inconsistent with contribution, 
if  contribution  is  considered  also  to  concern  the  joint  maintenance,  development  and 
exploitation of some commons or public goods. Moreover, they may contradict a previous 
distribution proportional to relative needs.  In fact, even if two individuals may cooperate 
within a bilateral transaction and share a surplus proportional to their relative contributions, 
they may also collude in order to profit from the appropriation of some common resource to 
the detriment of other parties who do not participate in their private transaction, and who thus 
see their access to the commons reduced (or crowded out), or their involuntary consumption 
of some public disadvantage (i.e. pollution)  increased. 
Accordingly, externality-based claims may be regarded as not independent of those based on 
the  two  above  principles,  namely  proportionality  to n e e d s  a n d  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  t o  
contributions.  They  should  be  better  understood  as  claims  for  redress  brought  because 
previous need-based claims and merit-based claims have not been met. This is part of what is 
understand here as externality-based claims: they are claims for redress or compensation for 
the failure to honour more basic moral claims based on needs or merits. Nevertheless, due to 
their  individual  characteristics  they  should  be  considered  as  distinct  from  other  claims 
because  they  may  be  made  after  some  initial  decision  concerning  primary  goods  or 
capabilities  has  been  taken  according  to  needs;  and t h e y  m a y  b e  m a d e  c o l l a t e r a l l y  t o  
allocations  and  distributive  decisions  made  in  some d o m a i n  w h e r e  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  t o  

contributions standard appears to be met. Thus, externality-based claims are made as further 
stakes prima facie independently of, and sometimes in additional to or against, other claims 
based on the foregoing two principles (typically against some special case of distribution 
according to contributions in the market domain).  
For example, access to a common environmental resource may have been initially allocated in 
proportion to needs between A, B and C. Then private activities begin wherein a subset of 
stakeholders  (say  A  and  B)  participate  in  the  production  of  some  private  good  and  are 
remunerated  according  to  their  contributions,  but  their  use  of  the  environmental  resource 
creates  externalities  for  the  agent  C  who  does  not  participate  in  it.  As  a  result,  over  the 
following  period  of  time  this  third  party  may  draw  on  a  smaller  endowment  of  natural 
resources, though at the same time has not benefited from the private business between A and 
B. In this description, need-claims are respected at time 1, contribution-based claims are met 
together for A and B at time 2, although time 3, because the externality spills over onto C, the 
principle of relative needs in the allocation of the common good is no longer effective. This 
justifies agent C’s externality-based claim for redress.  
Second example: at time 1, resources to provide collective security or basic education are 
allocated to A, B and C according their equal need for security and basic education. They are 
then under the obligation to participate in a collective action of ongoing maintenance and the 
development  of  security  or  education.  Their  relative  contributions  may  result  in  wealth 
differences,  though  without  interfering  with  their  equal  claims  for  security  and  basic 
education.  However, A and B may develop a technology for their private exchanges that 
enables them both also to improve their private security and the education of their children 
through their private exchange. They thus reduce their participation in the collective action 
providing collective security and basic education, yet nevertheless gain from C’s continuing 
participation in the collective effort (it should be remembered that private security is worse 
than  public  security  if  also  the  third  individual  stops  providing  public  security,  and  also 
overall  education  is  in  general  worsened  if  agent  C s t o p s  h i s / h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  b a s i c  
education).  Overall,  C  obtains  less  security  and  lower-quality  basic  education  than  what 
he/she deserves, and this provision is also inadequate for his/her needs. A and B instead fairly 
profit  from  their  contributions  to  their  private  transaction,  but  they  also  enjoy  additional 
security and education due to C’s contribution to public security and education, so that their 
level of security and their  children’s education is somewhat higher than the original level 

(low-quality basic education is supplemented by private specialist education). Thus, need-
claims are met at time 1, and merit-claims are also apparently respected within a stakeholders’ 
sub-domain  at  time  2.  But  at  time  3,  from  a  broader p e r s p e c t i v e ,  m e r i t  c l a i m s  t o  t h e  
maintenance of security and basic education are not respected, and the distribution of security 
and education no longer respects agent’s C needs. Hence C makes an externality-based claim 
for redress. 
Thus,  even  if  externality-based  claims  are  not  logically  independent,  they  may  arise 
empirically and temporally as claims separate from needs- and contributions-based claims. 
Prima facie, externality-based claims may clash with contribution-based claims that only on 
further  reflection  reveal  themselves  to  be  illegitimate  changes  compared  to  previous 
distributions  according  to  need-based  claims.  Moreover,  they  may  also  clash  with 
contribution-based claims related to the functioning of some sectional productive coalition 
which is shown on closer analysis to infringe also other contribution-based claims regarded, 
from  a  broader  perspective,  as  being  based  on  fair  contributions  to  the  maintenance, 
development and production of some public good or commons. Externality-based claims thus 
make it possible to include consideration of a dynamic element within our representation of 
possible types of claims and stakes: how previously stated needs-claims or merit-claims can 
in logical terms be turned against themselves, and how they can be restored in different form 
through redress and compensation after other merit claims, mainly exercised through market 
transactions, have been made and met.  
5.  Spheres of distributive justice and the priority ranking of claims  
The problem of the priority of the types of moral claims considered above may be resolved as 
follows. First, it is necessary to determine the proper context within which each type of claim 
predominates  in  the  argumentation  aimed  at  reaching i m p a r t i a l  a g r e e m e n t .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  
relative priority of each context is settled in terms of a model of constitutional and post-
constitutional social contract. In other words, we must first identify the spheres of application 
within which each principle of justice is intuitively appropriate, and then use the idea of a 
social contract in order to settle the logical priority and succession between different spheres 
so as to derive the overall agreement that sequentially satisfies each principle (type of claim) 
in due order.  The relevant spheres of justice are 

a) Manna from heaven context. This is a context where unanimous agreement must be 
reached on rights that give each stakeholder a privileged relationship with shares (if 
divisible) or use-rights (if not divisible) of primary goods or basic capabilities seen as 
“manna  from  heaven”.  ‘Manna’  is  taken  as  given,  not p r o d u c e d .  B e f o r e  a n y  
productive activity begins and any contribution is made to the manna’s maintenance 
or development, and before any production is undertaken through its use, a collective 
agreement on the criterion for the manna’s distribution must be endorsed by all of the 
parties  involved.  A  constitution  of  rights  must  be  established  before  any  further 
cooperative productive activity is undertaken whereby rights granting control over 
goods and capabilities may be employed as assets. Cooperation at the ‘manna level’ 
occurs prior to further cooperative employment of the manna, because stakeholders 
can use it for any goal only if they first agree on a principle of fair and impartial 
manna distribution. Otherwise primary goods and capabilities will vanish, or better 
will be destroyed by the eruption of conflicts among stakeholders. The idea is that 
manna is ‘cooperative in nature’, since it is only useful for furthering the society 
members’ life-plan, while it is unsuited to living in a ‘state of nature’ characterized by 
radical conflict, which would instead entail its rapid depletion.   
b) Non-manna  from  heaven  context,  type  I.  These  are  contexts  within  which  ‘manna 
goods and capabilities’ are actively employed as inputs for the production of further 
goods  and  services  and  to  bring  about  various  cooperative  surpluses.  Surplus,  of 
course, is not manna. In this context individuals join coalitions of various sizes in 
which  they  contribute  their  manna  endowment  as  inputs,  and  cooperation  within 
coalitions makes complementary-specific investments and team production possible. 
Effort  (based  on  capabilities)  is  provided  on  an  individual  basis  and  also  as 
inseparable productivity. Individuals expect some return from the various coalitions 
in which they participate in the production of many social surpluses. Coalitions are 
mainly seen here as firms and productive organizations operating in the market and 
providing marketable goods and services. 
c) Non-manna  from  heaven  context,  type  II.  Many  primary  goods  are  public  goods 
(universal, local or club goods) or commons, or include components of them (for 
example  ‘education’  has  a  public  good  component).  Whilst  they  may  be  initially 
distributed as manna, the maintenance, reproduction and development of these goods 

is nevertheless the result of collective action. Many individuals contribute their basic 
endowments of such primary goods as resources to an all-inclusive coalition or to 
sub-coalitions  including  subsets  of  the  population  aimed  respectively  at  the 
maintenance, reproduction or development of universal public goods or local public 
goods  and  commons.  Type  II  non-manna  contexts  include  mainly  non-market 
productive organizations providing types of social surplus through cooperation. Non-
manna activities of type I, however, interfere with the maintenance of public goods or 
commons through external effects. Thus, an individual who does not participate in 
some  non-manna  productive  type  I  coalitions  may  see h e r / h i s  m a n n a  e n d o w m e n t  
allocated to collective action in the non-manna type II context reduced or devalued as 
a result of the externalities spilling over onto her/him from these collateral market 
activities.  
It seems natural to order these contexts according to a logical sequence whereby, as the first 
step, the manna context arises and rights are allocated over basic goods and capabilities that 
have not yet been produced or elaborated through cooperation, whereas they are appropriated 
as they are given exogenously. These are resources that agents can voluntarily employ for the 
purposes of their life-plans only after their entitlement has been settled. Secondly, the non-
manna context of type I subsequently occurs and the manna endowments are exploited as 
resources  for  producing  something  extra  (surpluses) t h r o u g h  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  c o o p e r a t i v e  
activities and exchanges determined by private transactions between various individuals – and 
which can take place only according to voluntary agreements concerning the rightful use of 
manna endowments. Subsequent to the manna  context, but  in  parallel  with  the  first  non-
manna context, the non-manna context of type II also occurs in step 3: now public goods and 
commons, which are part of what was initially allocated as manna through rights assignments, 
are preserved (in fact manna, if not cared for, may deteriorate), improved and developed, and 
then used for the purposes of individual life-plans. These are also cooperative and voluntary 
activities carried out through coalitions of varying degrees that arise only because individuals 
confer their initial manna endowments. Hence also this step is strictly logically subsequent to 
the first step in the manna context. In this non-manna setting, market activities carried out in 
type I non-manna contexts may interfere through externalities that diminish the available level 
of manna, reduce its usefulness for right-holders and cause cooperative activities devoted to 
the manna’s preservation and improvement to fail. However, since such cooperation is subject 
to the typical Prisoners Dilemma and Public Good games paradoxes, it may also fail by itself.   

It can thus be ideally argued that, in the initial step, participants in a collective decision face a 
problem of distributive justice concerning the manna’s allocation: that is, the allocation of 
resources that are available before any contribution has yet been made, and that can be used to 
enter mutually advantageous cooperation only after allocation. At this stage therefore, the 
only acceptable principle is proportionality to relative needs, since no claim based on merit 
can have been put forward yet – since no contribution has yet been provided and natural 
talents do not matter as a basis for distributive principles.  Rights settled by agreement – 
which are logically claim-rights (Hohfeld) – may only have the content of claims based on 
relative needs, so that the principle for the allocation of rights is “to anyone according to 
his/her relative needs”.  
Thereafter, individuals use primary goods and capabilities over which they have control to 
make investments and to establish further cooperative relations by participating in various 
joint production and exchange activities which generate surpluses in terms of both private 
goods and public  goods or commons. Parties enter into multiple cooperative coalitions to 
which  they  make  contributions  within  the  limits  of  their  original  endowments  aimed  at 
increasing the value of what they may enjoy compared to how they would fare by relying on 
their  initial  endowments.  This  can  sometimes  be  done  through  complementary  specific 
investments and team production. Participants join each coalition by agreeing on the rights 
that they will legitimately claim later on over the distribution of the surplus that the coalition 
produces. Since the needs have already been met and participants make contributions, the 
distribution of the benefits must be proportional to the relative contributions. At this stage, 
rights to distributive shares can only take as their content claims based on merit understood as 
relative contributions.  Thus the rights allocation principle is “to anyone according to her/his 
relative contributions”. 
However, since each individual deploys at this stage exactly the resources that he/she has 
received at the first step, and since these resources were allocated according to the relative 
needs  principle,  the  end  result  (by  definition  consistent  with  the  proportionality  to 
contributions  principle)  must  also  reflect  the  proportionality  to  needs  principle.  In  fact, 
rational participation in any cooperative venture is regulated on an individual level by utility 
maximization, which in our context is essentially a measure of needs satisfaction (i.e. utility 
maximization means that a resource is deployed efficiently  by  the  individual  as  a  means 
needed  to  accomplish  her/his  life-plan).  Assuming  that  opportunistic  behaviour  does  not 

prevail,  each  individual  pushes  his/her  cooperative e f f o r t  i n  a ny  c o a l i t i o n  i n s o f a r  a s  i t  i s  
conducive to the satisfaction of his/her needs. Of course, this cannot prevent inequality of 
needs satisfaction if individuals have arbitrary or strongly unequal endowments. But this is 
not the case here, because the non-manna context is reached only after the distribution of 
basic goods and capabilities at the first step has been carried out in proportion to relative 
needs. Therefore, considering that agents maximize their utility (in our needs-related sense), 
the final distribution according to contribution (and merit) is  also proportional to relative 
needs. Meritocracy in this sense is literally secondary compared to the priority of the needs 
principle, and it is necessary in order to achieve a final distribution that reflects relative needs.   
This  still  only  occurs  if  productive  coalitions,  using  the  basic  endowments  of  their 
participants, do not negatively affect the basic endowments of other stakeholders: that is, if 
they only deploy the shares of basic endowments which agents voluntarily confer in order to 
participate in collective action or voluntarily exchanges, without causing external negative 
effects on other agents that do not participate. Special attention must therefore be paid to the 
third  step,  where  the  non-manna  context  is  entered  into  with  regard  to  the  preservation, 
development and deployment of public goods and commons. Since this too is a non-manna 
context, the proper principle of justice is proportionality to relative contribution, even though 
in  contexts  where  individual  contributions  are  not  separable,  remuneration  based  on 
contribution  must  be  egalitarian.  However,  the  essential  feature  is  that  in  these  contexts 
externalities deriving from cooperative activities undertaken in the non-manna context type I 
are possible. Therefore, in order to maintain consistency with the basic principle of relative 
needs and the condition relating to relative contribution, at this stage the distributive principle 
must  be  “redress  anyone  according  to  the  external  effects  to w h i c h  h e / s h e  h a s  b e e n  
subjected”. Thus the contents of rights settled at this stage are claims based on externalities.  
A natural way of encapsulating the operation of the ordering of spheres of justice and the 
priority of the relative needs principle with respect to other principles of justice is to represent 
the subject by means of a social contract model organized as a two-step collective bargain: 
the constitutional contract and post-constitutional contracts (see Brock 1978/9, Sacconi 1991, 
2000,  2006a,  2010).  The  first s t a g e  i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o i c e  o n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  rights 
modelled by a bargaining game amongst all cooperating stakeholders. The second stage is a 
coalition  game  that  the  stakeholders  play  within  the  rules  of  the  game  (the  constitution) 
selected  during  the  first  stage.  This  second  step  generates  a  final  allocation  of  payoffs.  

Because they are linked sequentially, the two games can be resolved by reasoning backwards.  
Constitutions  are  regarded  as  restrictions  on  the  strategies  available  to  the  players  in  the 
second-stage game (restrictions on one agent’s freedom of action correspond to other agents’ 
rights,  protections  and  endowments).  Each  second-stage  game  has  a  solution  in  terms  of 
payoff  allocation,  so  that  from  the  perspective  of  the  first-stage,  a  Constitution  may  be 
selected according to the final allocation of payoffs associated with the second stage game as 
foreseen from the ex ante constitutional perspective. Because this is a bargaining game, the 
first-stage game is resolved by the most accredited solution concept for such games, i.e. the 
Nash bargaining solution, which prescribes the maximization of the product of the players’ 
payoffs for agreements after deduction of status quo payoffs. Formally, this coincides with a 
distribution of the surplus proportional to relative marginal variations of the players’ utility.  
Under the additional assumption of interpersonal utility comparability, this may be interpreted 
as distribution proportional to a measure of their relative needs. The second-stage game is a 
coalitional  cooperative  game  played  within  a  given  institutional  framework  (a  given 
constitution of rights) that assigns each player certain rights and obligations. It must be solved 
by way of a solution concept that allocates a quantum of utility to each player related to 
his/her importance for each possible coalition. This brings us to a distributive principle based 
on  proportionality  to  relative  contribution.  But  it s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
arrangement  –  a  structure  of  rights  and  duties  that i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  e a c h  p l a y e r ’ s  
contribution to each coalition – is chosen on the constitutional level, so that what players are 
able  to  gain  on  the  basis  of  their  contributions  is a lso  a  d istr ib u tio n  a c c e p ta b le  f r o m th e  
constitutional point of view according to the relative needs principle.  
In addition to the two-step bargaining game outlined above, a third step must be introduced in 
order to account for the ex post decision on the amount of redress that it is agreed to pay after 
a coalitional game has been selected via a constitution, if the game’s cooperative solution 
relative to some domain causes external negative effects on the participants’ endowments that 
gives  rise  to  a  deviation  from  the  bargaining  solution  as  foreseen  from  the  initial 
constitutional perspective (as a matter of fact, the solution to the selected coalition game due 
to externalities will not coincide with the Nash bargaining solution in the constitutional step 
because, within the  given constitution, a coalition game does not prevent external effects 
affecting the basic endowments of some players). Thus in the post-constitutional stage, a third 
solution agreed to by participants is added to each constitution concerning fair redress. These 

rules  associated  with  each  constitution  can  also  be e n v i s a g e d  f r o m  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
agreement perspective, so that in the first stage only a constitution with the proper fair redress 
procedure added to the second stage coalition game will be selected. This corresponds to a 
specific constitution that, thanks to the proper redress rule, allows only for the formation of 
coalitions that either do not induce external effects or incorporate fair redress for social costs, 
so that the end result again approximates a distribution according to relative needs. 
6.  Concluding remarks  
The  above  pages  have  set  out  an  abstract  model  of  constitutional  and  post-constitutional 
contracts.  By  adhering  to  the  logic  of  agreement  appropriate  at  each  step  of  the  model 
(bargaining, coalition cooperative games and agreement over redress rules) we can infer the 
required priority order of the different stakeholders’ claims discussed in the previous sections. 
However, the most interesting aspect here is the implications this will have for a non-ideal 
view of the agreements that can be settled on SSR policies. The deliberative process and 
implementation mechanism for principles and goals whereby shared social responsibility is 
allocated to the different stakeholders must reflect the priority ordering of principles of justice 
that  entail  fair  treatment  of  the  stakeholders’  different  claims.  SSR  can  follow  from  the 
legitimacy of the claims satisfied by the policies. However, nothing will follow in terms of 
sharing responsibility if claims are not satisfied in the proper order according to the social 
contract model.  
We may therefore conclude that a ‘de facto’ agreement on policies achieved by stakeholders 
that puts merit claims before the satisfaction of the needs claims of the relevant stakeholders 
(for example, consider  health programs designed to  yield  the  maximum  profit  for  private 
insurance companies or to improve doctors’ pay, or rebuilding plans after earthquakes that 
favour  construction  companies,  etc.)  is  illegitimate,  and  hence  unable  to  bring  about  any 
effective sharing of social responsibility. In this case, the policy would not be consistent with 
subordination  of  the  ‘remuneration  according  to  contributions’  principle  to  the  goal  of 
achieving outcomes that satisfy need-based claims.  
In real-world situations, de facto bargains resting upon power relations between stakeholders 
participating in a deliberative process may give rise to decisions achieved by stakeholders 
only by pursuing merit claims.   In fact, it is simpler for them to join a collective action, since 
they  are  already  concentrated  into  a  homogeneous  professional  group,  are  less  dispersed 

across a broad territory, and have valuable resources to be dedicated to political pressure.  By 
contrast, it is simple to predict that externality-based claims may be underrepresented in the 
deliberative process leading to the settlement of principles and goals to be implemented by 
means of a call for SSR. In fact, externalities (for example environmental ones, but also the 
depletion of the public good component of education) typically spill over onto a large number 
of dispersed and not necessarily communicating and coordinated people who are unable to 
affect the decision process. In all these cases however, since actual deliberation procedures 
and  implementation  mechanisms  do  not  comply  with  the  social  contact  model,  no 
proclamation of SSR can be effective in eliciting a real sharing of social responsibility. This 
means it is even more important that the governance mechanisms and deliberative processes 
of SSR that can incorporate the normative requisites deriving from the social contract model 
(see Sacconi 2011 infra) be properly designed.  
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